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COLOR BLINDNESS BUT NOT MYOPIA: 
ANEWLOOKATSTATEACTION,EQUALPROTECTION, 
AND "PRIVATE" RACIAL DISCRIMINATIONt 
Theodore ]. St. Antoine* 
MR. Justice Frankfurter has remarked: "In law also the right answer usually depends on putting the right question. "1 
For nearly one hundred years now the courts have been putting 
certain key questions whenever confronted by the claim that a 
person was being deprived of the equal protection of the laws 
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment of the federal consti-
tution. From the time the "separate-but-equal" doctrine was 
enunciated in Plessy v. Ferguson2 until it was repudiated in the 
School Segregation Gases} two principal questions were likely to 
be asked about any classification based on racial grounds: (I) Did 
the classification result, not merely in the creation of separate 
facilities for the different races, but in the creation of unequal 
facilities? (2) Did the classification result from "state action," i.e., 
from the exercise of the state's legislative, executive, or judicial 
powers? Only if both questions were answered in the affirmative 
was there an unconstitutional deprivation of equal protection. 
In the School Segregation Gases of 1954 the Supreme Court 
held that in the field of public education, separate facilities were 
t This paper was awarded the first prize in the 1960 Broomfield Essay Competition 
at The University of Michigan. -Ed. 
• Member, District of Columbia, Michigan, and Ohio Bars. - Ed. 
l See, e.g., Estate of Rogers v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 410, 413 (1943). 
2 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding validity of state statutes requiring separate accom-
modations for whites and Negroes on intrastate railroads). The Supreme Court never 
applied the separate-but-equal doctrine to uphold laws limiting the right to own real 
estate, apparently because of the unique status of realty and the special protection afforded 
property under the Constitution. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 78-81 (1917); 
Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (1930). 
3 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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"inherently unequal."4 This of course did not expressly dispose 
of the separate-but-equal doctrine in other areas such as public 
transportation and recreational facilities.5 But in a subsequent 
series of brusque, sometimes cryptic per curiam decisions and 
orders, the Court left no doubt that the death knell had sounded 
for separate-but-equal.6 Classification on the basis of race was no 
longer open to a state. 
With the separate-but-equal factor effectively eliminated, the 
courts in racial discrimination or classification cases have now 
concentrated their attention on what apparently seems to them the 
remaining key question: Does the classification involve "state ac-
tion"? Close examination of recent Supreme Court and lower 
federal court decisions, especially those of the past half dozen 
years, provides strong evidence that the courts have not been, in 
the words of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, "putting the right question." 
The inevitable result of this failure will be an increasing tendency 
to come up with the wrong answer. Perhaps the courts' sounder 
instincts will somehow save them from this tendency.7 But surely 
it would be better if the Supreme Court could arrive at a more 
precise formulation of the crucial question in these cases - if only 
for the greater guidance of literal-minded lower court judges and 
the greater edification of theoretically-minded academicians. 
Specifically, nicer precision is called for in the formulation of 
the issue when the courts must look at racial discrimination prac-
4 Id. at 495. Previously, the application of the "separate-but-equal" doctrine to public 
educational facilities may have been assumed by the Supreme Court, but it had never 
been precisely decided. Id. at 491 n.8; see Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 
175 U.S. 528 (1899); Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927). In the decade and a half 
preceding Brown v. Board of Educ., the Supreme Court in a series of cases involving 
education on the graduate school level held that separate white and Negro facilities were 
not in fact equal, in view of the superior benefits enjoyed by the white students. Missouri 
ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of 
Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Okla-
homa State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
5 See K.auper, Segregation in Public Education: The Decline of Plessy v. Ferguson, 
52 M1mr. L. REv. 1137 (1954). 
6 Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954), vacating and remand-
ing per curiam "for consideration in the light of the Segregation Cases ••• and conditions 
that now prevail," 202 F .2d 725 (6th Cir. 1953) (public amphitheater leased for the holding 
of opera performances for the public); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955), 
affirming per. curiam 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955) (public beaches); Holmes v. Atlanta, 
350 U.S. 879 (1955), vacating per curiam 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955) (public golf courses 
and parks); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956), affirming per curiam 142 F. Supp. 707 
(M.D. Ala. 1956) (state-regulated public transportation); State Athletic Comm'n v. Dorsey, 
359 U.S. 533 (1959), affirming per curiam 168 F. Supp. 149 (E.D. La. 1958) (state-regulated 
athletic contests). 
7 See discussion of Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956), and related 
cases, infra, part II. 
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ticed or initiated by persons or groups traditionally regarded as 
"private." What question or questions should be posed by a court 
in this type of case to determine whether there has been a depriva-
tion of a constitutional right, particularly the right to equal pro-
tection of the laws under the fourteenth amendment? To put the 
problem in perspective, and, hopefully, to point the way toward its 
solution, it is first necessary to review the development of Supreme 
Court doctrine regarding constitutional limitations on "state" and 
"private" action, and to analyze some of the possible implications 
of these doctrines. 
I. IN SEARCH OF EQUALITY: THE COURSE OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
DOCTRINE ON "PRIVATE" DISCRIMINATION 
The fourteenth amendment, ratified in 1868, provides: " ... 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." And with similar 
emphasis upon the "State" as the target of the prohibition, the 
fifteenth amendment, ratified in 1870, declares that the right of 
United States citizens to vote "shall not be denied or abridged by 
the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or pre-
vious condition of servitude." 
There is both contemporaneous evidence and subsequent 
scholarly judgment that these prohibitions were intended to op-
erate against "individual" or "private" action as well as against 
"state" action.8 Resort was even had at an early date to the rather 
sophisticated argument that individual or private action is neces-
sarily covered because all action is either forbidden, required, or 
permitted by the state.9 
8 See FLACK, THE AooPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 262-63 (1908). 
o Representative Lawrence of Ohio, discussing pending civil rights legislation in 1874, 
said of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment: 
"The object of this provision is to make all men equal before the law. If a State 
permits inequality in rights to be created or meted out by citizens or corporations enjoying 
its protection it denies the equal protection of the laws. What the State permits by its 
sanctions, having the power to prohibit, it does in effect itself ..•. 
"When it is said 'no State shall deny to any person the equal protection' of these 
laws, the word 'protection' must not be understood in any restricted sense, but must include 
every benefit to be derived from laws. The word 'deny' must include an omission by any 
State to enforce or secure the equal rights designed to be protected. There are sins of 
omission as well as commission. A State which omits to secure rights denies them.'' 2 
CONG. REc. 412 (1874). 
For recent discussions of the proposition that all action in a sense involves state 
action, see Barnett, What Is State Action? 24 ORE. L. REv. 227, 228 (1945); Shanks, "State 
Action" and the Girard Estate Case, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 213, 218 (1956); Horowitz, The 
Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 So. CAL. L. REv. 
208, 208-09 (1957). 
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The issue was seemingly put to rest by the Supreme Court in 
the Civil Rights Cases10 of 1883. In the Civil Rights Act of 1875,11 
Congress had provided both criminal and civil sanctions against 
"any person" denying equal accommodations in inns, public con-
veyances, theaters, and other places of public amusement because 
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Speaking 
through Mr. Justice Bradley, the Court struck down the enactment 
as beyond the constitutional power of Congress. Of the four-
teenth amendment12 it was said: "It is state action of a particular 
character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual 
rights is not the subject matter of the amendment."13 Then, in a 
sentence strangely marked by overtones of potential enlargement 
as well as by the obvious note of restriction, Mr. Justice Bradley 
commented: 
"The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any 
such authority, is simply a private wrong, or a crime of that in-
dividual; an invasion of the rights of the injured party, it is 
true, whether they affect his person, his property or his 
reputation; but if not sanctioned in some way by the State, or 
not done under state authority, his rights remain in full force, 
and may presumably be vindicated by resort to the laws of 
the State for redress."14 
Mr. Justice Harlan dissented vigorously. In flat contradiction 
to the majority, he asserted that the fourteenth amendment created 
federal rights, enforceable directly by Congress, against all racial 
discrimination except that of a purely social nature. But he was 
willing also to meet the majority on its own ground. Even conced-
ing that adverse state action was an essential element of an abridg-
ment of rights under the amendment, said he, the Act of 1875 
could be upheld. For railroads, innkeepers, and places of public 
amusement are "agents or instrumentalities of the State, because 
they are charged ·with duties to the public, and are amenable, in 
respect of their duties and functions, to governmental regula-
tion."15 
10 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See also United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); United 
States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883). 
11 Sections l, 2, 18 Stat. 335·36 (1875). 
12 The consideration in the Civil Rights Cases of the effect of the thirteenth amend-
ment, which concededly operates against private persons in forbidding slavery or involun-
tary servitude, is not pertinent to the present inquiry into the constitutional limitations on 
other forms of racial discrimination. 
13 109 U.S. at 11. 
14 ld. at 17. (Emphasis added.) 
15 Id. at 58-59. 
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Despite certain contrary historical testimony, and despite the 
high authority of Mr. Justice Harlan, whose lone, stirring dissent 
in Plessy was later to be so fully vindicated, it is safe to say that no 
member of the present Supreme Court has seriously questioned 
the abstract soundness of the fundamental principle affirmed by 
the majority in the Civil Right Gases. The pertinent provisions 
of the fourteenth amendment operate only against "such action as 
may fairly be said to be that of the States."16 
How, then, does a state act? Very early the Supreme Court 
declared that a state may act through its legislative, executive, or 
judicial authorities, adding broadly that whoever acts "by virtue 
of public position under a state government . . . acts in the name 
and for the State, and is clothed ·with the State's power," so that 
"his act is that of the State."17 A state judge may thus be subject 
to federal criminal penalties for excluding Negroes from jury 
service, and thereby depriving colored defendants of equal pro-
tection, even though he acts on his own initiative and without the 
authorization or compulsion of state law.18 And a municipal ordi-
nance is state action for purposes of the fourteenth amendment, 
even though the provisions of the particular ordinance may be in 
conflict with the state constitution.19 
What if the actions of individual public officials not only are 
unauthorized by state law, but also are in direct violation of it? 
May their conduct still fairly be said to be that of the state? For 
some time the Supreme Court vacillated on this issue, but the 
question was finally resolved in Screws v. United States.20 A 
Georgia sheriff and two assistants brutally beat to death a young 
Negro they had arrested on a ·warrant charging him with the theft 
of a tire. There was evidence that the sheriff had a personal 
grudge against the Negro. The sheriff and his assistants were 
convicted of willfully denying rights under the fourteenth amend-
ment while acting under color of state law. Although the Su-
16 Vinson, C.J., speaking for a unanimous Court in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 
{1948). 
17 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1880). See also Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 
U.S. 303 (1880) (state statute excluding Negroes from jury service); Yick. Wo v. Hopkins, 
ll8 U.S. 356 (1886) {discriminatory administration of county licensing law by board of 
supervisors so as to exclude Chinese laundries). 
18 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880). 
19 Home Telephone &: Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913). 
20 325 U.S. 91 (1945); see also United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941) 
("misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the 
wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken 'under color of' state 
law"); Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
But cf. Darney v. City of New York, 193 U.S. 430 (1904). 
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preme Court technically reversed, six Justices21 were in agree-
ment on one basic proposition. Acts of an individual state official 
in the discharge of his official duties are state action, even though 
the particular acts may violate state law. Effectively, then, the 
fourteenth amendment reaches all the formally designated agents 
of the state whenever they are performing official functions. 
So there is left that vast area of so-called "private" action. The 
individual householder invites to his cocktail parties only persons 
with a pigmentation akin to his own. All the individual house-
holders in a community sign agreements they will not sell their 
homes to Negroes. The great insurance company runs a picture-
book residential community and sees that it stays antiseptically 
Caucasian. The department store chain employs colored janitors 
but not colored accountants. The philanthropist dies and leaves 
his millions to build a school for white orphans. Under what cir-
cumstances, if any, are such activities subject, either directly or 
indirectly, to the fourteenth amendment's prohibition against the 
denial of "equal protection"? 
The courts of course have had no trouble finding state action 
when a state statute or city ordinance affirmatively requires a pri-
vate person to act in a discriminatory manner. A statute requiring 
an employer to dismiss all alien employees in excess of 20 percent 
of his working force was thus invalid as a deprivation of equal 
protection.22 But an injunction preventing state officials from 
enforcing such discriminatory legislation may not be the only 
direct remedy available. Where state law required a bus company 
to maintain racial segregation, the company has been held liable in 
damages for enforcing the unconstitutional statute, on the ground 
that it was acting "under color of state law."23 The Supreme Court 
itself has pointed the way toward what might become an even 
broader approach for holding "private" action subject to constitu-
tional limitations. It has said that a state statute was invalid which 
affirmatively permitted, though it did not require, a railroad to 
provide unequal transportation facilities for whites and Negroes.24 
21 Stone, C.J., and Black, Douglas, Reed, Rutledge, and Murphy, JJ. Dissenting were 
Roberts, Frankfurter, and Jackson, JJ. 
22Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915). See also Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
23 Flemming v. South Carolina Electric & Gas Co., 224 F.2d 752 (4th Cir. 1955). 
24 McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151 (1914). See also Missouri ex 
rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280 F.2d 
531 (5th Cir. 1960). That state action may be found in official inaction or failure to pro• 
tect private rights is indicated by Catlette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902 (4tb Cir. 1943); 
Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945); Lynch v. United States, 189 
F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1951). See also Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921). 
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And the Court has seemed to indicate in such instances that the 
federal courts could entertain a suit directly against the railroads 
for an injunction restraining them from taking advantage of the 
state legislation permitting them to discriminate. 
The sharpest acceleration in the forward thrust of "state action" 
into areas formerly deemed private has come in the past fifteen 
years or so. In several significant cases the Supreme Court has held 
or has suggested that certain actions of "private" groups or or-
ganizations are subject to constitutional limitations. In each of 
these situations there seems to have been present one or more of 
the following three crucial elements: (I) the private body was 
exercising a basic state function, typically with the affirmative 
cooperation of the state;215 (2) the private body was invoking affirm-
ative state action by seeking judicial enforcement of a private con-
tract;26 or (3) the private body had derived its power to act in a 
particular capacity or engage in a specific activity, usually monopo-
listic or exclusive, by virtue of a statute, and was regulated in the 
exercise of this power by governmental authority.27 Cases in the 
first two categories bear especially close examination.28 
Terry v. Adams29 was the culmination of a series of efforts by 
certain white citizens of Texas to thwart the right of Negroes to 
vote. Previously, in Smith v. Allwright,30 the Supreme Court had 
held that where primary elections in a state are an integral part of 
the election process and are conducted by a political party under 
215 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); 
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). Attempts to eliminate alleged racial discrimination 
within labor unions by holding them to constitutional standards on a somewhat similar 
theory were rejected in Williams v. Yellow Cab Co., 200 F.2d 302, 307 (3d Cir. 1952) 
(union not exercising "a basic state function''), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 840 (1953), Ross v. 
Ebert, 275 Wis. 523, 82 N.W.2d 315 (1957), and Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locomotive 
Firemen, 262 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1959), but were viewed 
favorably in Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P .2d 831 (1946). 
26 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). 
27 Steele v. Louisville&: N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (exclusive collective bargaining 
representative required by Congress to represent all members of a craft without discrim-
ination); Public Utilities Com.m'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) (public transport utility 
specifically permitted by governmental commission to operate radio programs); Railway 
Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956) (exclusive collective bargaining repre-
sentative expressly authorized by Congress to enter into union shop agreements otherwise 
invalid under state law). See also Machinists v. Street, 215' Ga. 27, 108 S.E.2d 796 (1959), 
prob. juris. noted, 361 U.S. 807 (1959). 
28 Cases in the third category involve federally-regulated bodies, and so the govern-
mental action at issue was that of Congress rather than that of a state. And the primary 
attention of the Court was on the action of Congress or of a governmental regulatory 
agency, not on the action of the private body itself. 
29 345 U.S. 461 (1953). 
80 321 U.S. 649 (1944), overruling Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935). See also 
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932). 
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state statutory authority, the action of the party in excluding 
Negroes from voting is the action of the state. Consequently the 
fifteenth amendment, which is identical to the fourteenth in apply-
ing only to state action, forbade such exclusion. The last resort 
of the whites in a particular Texas county was the Jaybird Party. 
The Jaybirds also excluded Negroes from voting in their primary. 
Victors in the Jaybird primary almost invariably had no opposition 
in the Democratic primaries and general elections that followed. 
But the Jaybirds contended that they were merely a self-governing 
voluntary club, not a state-regulated political party, and that the 
fifteenth amendment did not prohibit their racial exclusions. 
In Terry eight Justices, on somewhat diverse grounds, found 
that the fifteenth amendment reached the Jaybirds. Justices Black, 
Douglas, and Burton declared that the Jaybird primary had become 
an integral, indeed the effective, part of the elective process, ob-
serving: "For a state to permit such a duplication of its election 
processes is to permit a flagrant abuse of those processes. . . .''31 
Justice Frankfurter emphasized the full participation of the coun-
ty's elected officials, and concluded that this fastened responsibility 
on "the State, through the action and abdication of those whom 
it has clothed with authority .... "32 Mr. Chief Justice Vinson and 
Justices Clark, Reed, and Jackson deemed the Jaybirds to be part 
and parcel of the Democratic Party, so that A llwright governed. 
Yet they went on to say that "when a state structures its electoral 
apparatus in a form which devolves upon a political organization 
the uncontested choice of public officials, that organization itself, 
in whatever disguise, takes on those attributes of government which 
draw the Constitution's safeguards into play."33 
So there is substantial sentiment on the Court that when a state 
permits private organizations to take over the electoral processes -
"matters of high public interest" in Mr. Justice Cardozo's phrase -
they become "to that extent the organs of the State itself.''34 
An extension of this sentiment may be reflected in Marsh v. 
Alabama.35 Chickasaw, Alabama, was wholly owned by the Gulf 
Shipbuilding Corporation, but otherwise had "all the character-
istics of any other American town." Posted company rules prohib-
ited solicitation without permission. A Jehovah's Witness distrib-
31345 U.S. at 469. (Emphasis added.) 
32 Id. at 477. (Emphasis added.) 
33 Id. at 484. (Emphasis added.) 
34 Cardozo, J., speaking for the Court in Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 88 (1932), 
85 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
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uting religious literature on a sidewalk. accessible to the public was 
told to leave. When she declined she was arrested by a county 
deputy sheriff, who was paid by the company to be the town's 
policeman. The Witness was convicted in state court for remain-
ing on another's premises after being told to depart. The Supreme 
Court reversed on the basis of the first and fourteenth amendments. 
Mr. Justice Black for the Court spoke of the operation of the 
town as being a "public function," and concluded that property 
rights in the premises were not sufficient to justify "the State's 
permitting a corporation to govern a community of citizens so as 
to restrict their fundamental liberties and the enforcement of such 
restraint by the application of a state statute.'>s0 Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, concurring, was less cautious than he afterward proved in 
Terry about the necessity of pinning down formal state action. 
In Marsh it was enough for him that "a company-owned town is a 
town. In its community aspects it does not differ from other 
towns.''37 
Subsequent references to Marsh make it difficult to say whether 
the decision turned chiefly on the state's criminal enforcement of 
the company's exclusion, or on the special status of the town itself 
as a source of state action.38 But plainly it would have been a 
different question had an individual householder invoked police 
assistance against the Witness.39 
Judicial enforcement of private contracts as state action was the 
central issue in Shelley v. Kraemer.40 Negroes purchased land in 
a district which had been made subject to covenants restricting 
the use or occupancy of the realty to Caucasians. Relying on the 
covenants, other property owners obtained a state court injunction 
to restrain the Negroes from occupying the land they had pur-
chased. The Supreme Court unanimously held that the Negroes 
had been deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed 
by the fourteenth amendment. 
It was not the restrictive covenants "standing alone," nor "vol-
untary adherence to their terms," that violated the fourteenth 
amendment, said the Court, since that amendment "erects no shield 
86 ]d. at 507, 509. 
37 Id. at 510. 
38 Compare Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 643 (1951), with Frankfurter, J., con• 
curring in Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268,277 (1951). 
so See Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143-44 (1943). 
40 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See also Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) (similar result under 
the due process clause of the fifth amendment in the District of Columbia). 
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against merely private conduct."41 But the active intervention of 
the state courts, bringing to bear the coercive power of govern-
ment, was state action "in the full and complete sense of the 
phrase. "42 The restrictions sought to be created by the private 
agreement could not have been imposed by state statute or local 
ordinance.43 So neither could they be enforced by a state court. 
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, writing for the Court, scornfully 
brushed aside the argument that the state courts were not depriv-
ing Negroes of equal protection so long as they stood ready to 
enforce restrictive covenants against white persons as well. "Equal 
protection of the laws is not achieved through indiscriminate im-
position of inequalities."44 
Five years later, in Barrows v. ]ackson,45 the Court settled a 
question left unanswered by Shelley. A racial restrictive covenant, 
as well as being unenforceable in equity by injunction, was held 
to be unenforceable at law for damages against a co-covenantor who 
sold to a Negro. On the award of damages as an exercise of state 
action, the Court was brief: "The result of that sanction by the 
State would be to encourage the use of restrictive covenants. To 
that extent, the State would put its sanction behind the cove-
nants. "46 
With its emphasis upon state "sanctions" as the state action 
calling into play fourteenth amendment safeguards, the Court was 
harking back to the words of Mr. Justice Bradley in the Civil 
Rights Cases. And yet, seventy years later, the Court still seemed 
no closer to asking itself: "Does it make any difference what type 
of private conduct is sanctioned?" Shelley and Barrows had left 
the Court with a constitutional doctrine of sweeping scope, un-
critically adopted, its implications unplumbed. Much can be ad-
mired in the effort to add force to Mr. Justice Harlan's noble dic-
tum, "Our Constitution is color-blind."47 But with a short-sighted 
approach, unforeseen pitfalls could well be expected. They were 
not long in showing up. 
41334 U.S. at 13. Cf. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926) (recognizing validity 
of restrictive covenants as such, in the District of Columbia). 
42 334 U.S. at 19. 
43 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (1930). 
44 334 U.S. at 22. 
45 346 U.S. 249 (1953). 
46 Id. at 254. 
47 Dissenting in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896). 
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II. THE WRONG RoAD TAKEN: A CONSTITUTIONAL DocTRINE 
HEADS TOWARD A DEAD END 
Sergeant Rice was a Korean War casualty, and a Winnebago 
Indian. His body was returned to Sioux City, Iowa, for burial. 
After services were conducted at the grave site in a private ceme-
tery, the cemetery management, having discovered the deceased's 
non-Caucasian antecedents, refused to permit interment. Sergeant 
Rice's wife sued the cemetery for damages for mental suffering. 
The cemetery defended on the basis of a covenant in the contract 
of sale of the burial lot limiting burial privileges to Caucasians. 
The Iowa courts ruled that the clause was unenforceable, but that 
it was not void and could be relied upon by the cemetery as a 
defense to the damage action.48 The Supreme Court affirmed by 
an equally divided Court.49 In the meantime the Iowa legislature 
had taken steps to prevent a recurrence of such a case - though it 
provided no relief for Mrs. Rice. The Supreme Court granted a 
rehearing, vacated its prior judgment of affirmance, and dismissed 
the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.50 Mr. Chief Justice 
Warren and Justices Black and Douglas dissented. On the issue 
of "state action," Mr. Justice Frankfurter, for the Court, did no 
more than deliver himself of the view that it was a "complicated 
problem."51 
Cutter Laboratories :fired Doris Walker, supposedly on the 
ground she was a Communist. But an arbitrator found there was 
no "just cause" for the dismissal, ruling the company had waived 
party membership as a basis. California refused to enforce the 
arbitration award. Five members of the United States Supreme 
Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Clark, dismissed a 1VTit of cer-
tiorari.52 To the Court, all that was involved was a state construc-
tion of "just cause" in a local contract as being equivalent to 
Communist Party membership, with no federal question being 
presented. Shelley and Barrows were not even cited. 
Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. Chief Justice Warren and 
Mr. Justice Black concurred, dissented strongly. Mr. Justice 
48 Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 245 Iowa 147, 60 N.W.2d 110 
(1953). For a refusal to allow a residential racial restrictive covenant to be used as a 
defense in a damage action, see Clifton v. Puente, 218 S.W .2d 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949). 
40 Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 348 U.S. 880 (1954). 
r;o Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 349 U.S. 70 (1955). 
51 Id. at 72. 
52 Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956). 
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Douglas conceded that a private employer could arrange for an all-
Democratic labor force. But government could not. "And," he 
continued with rigorous logic, "if the courts lend their support to 
any such discriminatory program, Shelley v. Kraemer . .. teaches 
that the government has thrmrn its weight behind an unconstitu-
tional scheme to discriminate against citizens by reason of their 
political ideology."53 
Would Mr. Justice Douglas deny a private householder police 
assistance in barring Jehovah's Witnesses from his front porch, 
while admitting Methodist ministers? Probably not. Here the 
householder would be able to assert due process rights of his mrn 
against governmental regulation. But at least Mr. Justice Douglas 
seems to mean that whenever a private party cannot interpose 
countervailing constitutional rights (and fair employment prac-
tices legislation does not deprive an employer of due process114), 
then the state may not assist him in practicing discrimination for-
bidden to the state.55 And there is much in Shelley and Barrows, 
taken at face value, to support the logic of such a conclusion. At 
least the majority in Cutter Laboratories supplied no sound dis-
tinction. 
The relationship of private action to state action again arose 
to plague the Court in the Girard College case.56 Stephen Girard 
died in 1831, leaving a fund in trust to run a school for "poor 
white male orphans." The will named the City of Philadelphia as 
trustee, and eventually the trust came to be administered by a city 
board set up under a state statute. The board refused to admit two 
applicants to the school solely because they were Negroes. The Su-
preme Court in a per curiam decision held that the board, as a 
state agency, could not practice racial discrimination. Even though 
the board was acting as a trustee, its action was state action. Per-
haps Sioux City Cemetery and Cutter Laboratories had given the 
Court pause; its only reliance was on the School Segregation Cases, 
and Shelley was ignored. 
The next move in Girard was obvious. The Pennsylvania 
courts removed the state-created board as trustee, and appointed 
53 Id. at 302-03. 
54 See Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945); Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 1138 (1955). 
55 For such an interpretation of the Cutter Laboratories dissent, see Abernathy, Ex• 
pansion of the State Action Concept Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 
375, 415-16 (1958). 
56 Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, 353 U.S. 230 (1957). 
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a wholly private trustee.57 But the Supreme Court declined the 
gambit, denying certiorari.58 In view of Shelley, was there no 
longer state action merely because the state courts were enforcing 
the racially-discriminatory will through a private rather than a 
public trustee?59 
Then came Boynton v. Virginia.60 A Negro law student, travel-
ing by bus from Washington, D. C., to Montgomery, Alabama, 
entered the white section of a restaurant in a bus terminal during 
a short stopover and demanded service. When he refused to leave 
on being ordered, he was arrested and convicted of criminal tres-
pass. His petition for certiorari presented only constitutional ques-
tions under the commerce clause and the fourteenth amendment. 
But the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Black, went far out 
of its way to dodge the constitutional issue. It ruled in the Negro 
passenger's favor on a much more narrow statutory ground, by 
stretching the Motor Carrier Act's anti-discrimination ban to cover 
even a restaurant operated by a private lessee of an independent 
terminal company in a terminal at which interstate buses make 
regular stopovers. Are even the dissenters in Cutter Laboratories 
becoming dubious about the reach of their doctrine? At least there 
is no indication they are winning new adherents for it. 
This impression is reinforced by the latest word from the Su-
preme Court. In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority61 the 
Court held that a Negro had been denied equal protection when 
refused service in a restaurant occupying leased space in a public 
parking building. But at least as significant as the holding was 
the tone of Mr. Justice Clark's majority opinion. It was a model 
57 See Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 
570 (1958). 
fiS Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts of Philadelphia, 357 U.S. 570 
(1958). 
59 See generally Shanks, "State Action" and the Girard Estate Case, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 
213 (1956); Clark, Charitable Trusts, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Will of Stephen 
Girard, 66 YALE L.J. 979 (1957). 
oo 364 U.S. 454 (1960). The Court must next come to grips with state convictions of 
Negro "sit-in" demonstrators in Gamer v. Louisiana, and related cases. (Nos. 617-619, 
Oct. Term 1960). Certiorari was granted in these cases on March 20, 1961. 365 U.S. 840 
(1961). The strategists for the Negro litigation managed to present the first Supreme 
Court test of the "sit-in" issue in an unusually favorable posture. Unlike the typical 
situation in which colored demonstrators have been convicted of criminal trespass upon 
the complaint of a private store owner, Gamer and its companion cases involve Negro 
students who were prosecuted for a breach of the peace after being arrested by police 
officers apparently acting on their own initiative. See N.Y. Times, March 21, 1961, p. 18, 
col. 3. 
61 365 U.S. 715 (1961), reversing 157 A.2d 894 (Del. 1960), 59 MICH. L. REv. 450 (1961). 
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of circumspection, if not irresolution. The Court's decision was 
expressly limited to its facts, and then every fact was culled out 
that might possibly serve to link the restaurant with the public 
authorities. The parking facility was built, owned, and operated 
by a state agency. The leased premises were not surplus public 
property, but were originally intended for commercial tenants as 
an essential part of the plan for financing the project. The con-
junction of restaurant and parking area made each more attractive 
to patrons. Both facilities by their very nature were designed for 
serving the public. And the state, in its lease, could have required 
the restaurant to operate nondiscriminatorily. Mr. Justice Clark 
even took note of the state flag flying atop the building. 
Mr. Justice Stewart concurred on a more narrow ground. He 
pointed out that in upholding the restaurant's right to discrimi-
nate, the state court had relied on a statute permitting a restaurant 
proprietor to refuse service to persons "offensive to the major part 
of his customers." For Mr. Justice Stewart, the fourteenth amend-
ment was thus violated by a legislative authorization for a discrim-
inatory classification based exclusively on color. Justices Frank-
furter, Harlan, and Whittaker dissented. They contended the case 
should have been remanded to the state court for a clarification of 
the precise basis for its refusal to grant the Negro declaratory and 
injunctive relief. 
Nothing was heard from the three Cutter Laboratories dissent-
ers, all of whom were apparently willing to go quietly along with 
Mr. Justice Clark's reasoning. Not one raised an obvious point: 
What had happened to the Shelley-Barrows doctrine of judicial 
action as state action? Could it not be argued that the proscribed 
state action was to be found right in the state court order denying 
the Negro a remedy, thereby lending the state's assistance to the 
private discrimination? Or may Shelley be invoked only against a 
party who, in furtherance of a discriminatory purpose, is affirma-
tively seeking judicial aid to alter the status quo? Fortunately for 
the Court, the facts of Burton justified an entirely different ap-
proach, and once again the hard questions implicit in Shelley and 
Barrows could be avoided. 
Lacking such Supreme Court escape hatches as denials or dis-
missals of certiorari, the lower federal courts and the state courts 
have meanwhile had to :flounder as best they could amidst a whole 
wave of cases on the possible constitutional implications of "pri-
vate" action. 
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As if anticipating Burton, the courts readily have found the 
requisite state action to invoke constitutional protections when a 
state leases its facilities to a private person or group for carrying on 
activities or offering services open to the public. So racial discrim-
ination may not be practiced by the lessees of public parks or golf 
courses,62 or of a cafeteria in a county courthouse.63 But it is un-
doubtedly significant that in these situations the lessees' activities 
by their very nature are accessible to the public generally. Surely 
a state should not be foreclosed from leasing a public auditorium 
for a convocation of the Ancient Order of Hibernians. 
The mere receipt by an organization of state funds, financial 
support, or other assistance has not been deemed enough to con-
stitute the recipient a state instrumentality, 64 unless the effective 
power of management and control is also lodged in the state.65 
Obviously the introduction of state assistance invites the closest 
scrutiny of particular facts. Tax exemptions for charitable institu-
tions might be one thing, and substantial support of the only hos-
pital in a county quite another. 
Persistent efforts to find state action in the private operation 
of housing projects, public transportation, and places of public 
amusement echo curiously the three types of facilities which Mr. 
Justice Harlan in the Civil Rights Cases regarded as state instru-
mentalities because of their public function. Housing develop-
ments, no matter how large, have generally continued to avoid 
being tagged with governmental attributes.66 In transportation67 
62 Department of Conservation v. Tate, 231 F.2d 615 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 
U.S. 838 (1956); Greensboro v. Simkins, 246 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1957). See also Muir v. 
Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954), vacating 202 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953). 
But cf. Charlotte Park &: Recreation Comm'n v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d 114 
(1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956) (private grant of land for public parks, with 
reverter if used by non-whites). 
63 Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924 
(1957). For a discussion of the status of lessees of public property under numerous other 
federal and state court rulings, see 59 MICH. L. REv. 450 (1961). 
64 Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949) (four-to-three 
decision), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950) (Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting); Eaton v. 
James Walker Memorial Hospital, 261 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984 
(1959); (Warren, C.J., and Douglas and Brennan, JJ., dissenting). Cf. Vincennes University 
v. Indiana, 14 How. (55 U.S.) 268 (1852) (grant of public land to university trustees did 
not make trustees a public corporation). 
61i Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 
U.S. 721 (1945). 
66 Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied, 
339 U.S. 981 (1950); Johnson v. Levitt &: Sons, 131 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Pa. 1955). But cf. 
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
67 Flemming v. South Carolina Electric &: Gas Co., 224 F.2d 752 (4th Cir. 1955); Boman 
v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960). See also Chance v. Lambeth, 
186 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1951), tert. denied, 341 U.S. 941 (1951). 
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and amusement68 cases the courts have seemed to plant one foot 
on a Harlan-type doctrine and one on a Shelley-type; they discourse 
at length on the "public" nature of these facilities, even when pri-
vately operated, but then hunt for legislation requiring or permit-
ting racial discrimination, or for enforcement of the discrimination 
by the state police and courts, as the crucial element of state action. 
Does this mean that the Shelley doctrine will be applied to the 
point of forbidding all private discrimination based on a classifi-
cation the state itself could not properly make, so long as there is 
state enforcement in the picture? Quite clearly not. A man, for 
example, can still bequeath property with a gift over if the legatee 
marries a person of a prohibited faith.69 And setting aside the 
easiest case of the householder discriminating against guests on 
racial grounds, the owner of an ice cream parlor can so far still 
constitutionally secure police assistance against persons whose pa-
tronage is unwanted because of their race.70 
Logically extended, the Shelley-Barrows rule simply will not 
go down. For by now it is plain that in every case before the courts 
- in the probate of a will, in the enforcement of an arbitration 
award regarding an employee discharge, in a criminal prosecution 
for trespass on a private lawn - there is state action in a true 
sense.71 And if the courts in adjudicating rights and relationships 
between private persons must hold every private person to the 
identical constitutional standards binding on a state, then effec-
tively over eighty-five years of unbroken constitutional rulings go 
by the board, and individual action for all practical purposes be-
comes subject to the fourteenth amendment. This no one now 
seriously proposes. A search fo~ a new test is in order. 
III. THE HARD QUESTION MAY BE RIGHT: WHEN Is PRIVATE 
ACTION STATE ACTION? 
Put to one side cases involving the acts of formally designated 
state agents, or the acts of private persons or groups done pursuant 
68 Valle v. Stengel, 176 F.2d 697 (3d Cir. 1949); Watkins v. Oaklawn Jockey Club, 183 
F.2d 440 (8th Cir. 1950); Griffin v. Collins, 187 F. Supp. 149 (D. Md. 1960). 
69 United States Bank of Portland v. Snodgrass, 202 Ore. 530, 275 P.2d 860 (1954); 
Gordon v. Gordon, 332 Mass. 197, 124 N.E.2d 228 (1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 947 (1955). 
See also Charlotte Park &: Recreation Comm'n v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d 114 
(1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956). But cf. Claremont Improvement Club v. 
Buckingham, 89 Cal. App. 2d 32, 200 P.2d 47 (1948) (court refused declaratory judgment 
that restrictive covenant, standing alone, was valid, since such declaration would be state 
action enforcing the covenant). 
70 State v. Clyburn, 247 N.C. 455, 101 S.E.2d 295 (1958). Cf. Williams v. Howard 
Johnson's Restaurant, 268 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1959). 
71 See note 9 supra. 
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to the formal mandate of a state. Concentrate upon the case which 
involves only the acts of private persons having no formal con-
nection to the state. At this point, surely, if the distinction be-
tween state action and private action is to have any genuine 
meaning, the applicability of constitutional limitations must hinge 
on the nature of the private activity itself - and not on the bare 
presence of state enforcement or adjudication. 
Assume that the Supreme Court's instincts, if not its rational-
izations, have been sound, and that its actual holdings in both 
Shelley and Cutter Laboratories are correct. Is there an essential 
difference between a racial restrictive covenant and an employment 
contract, or in the legal status of the parties relying on them, so 
that in the one case but not in the other a federal constitutional 
question is raised when enforcement is sought in the state courts? 
A trenchant analysis of this problem has been made by Profes-
sor Glenn Abernathy of the University of South Carolina.72 For 
him the key to the solution lies in the distinction, elaborated in 
such Supreme Court decisions as Collins v. Hardyman,78 between 
a person's federal rights and his state rights. Professor Abernathy 
proceeds as follows. Only federal rights, and not state rights, are 
secured or protected by the federal constitution. Two willing 
persons may have a state right, though not a federal right, to enter 
into a contractual relationship. But they do have a federal right 
under the fourteenth amendment that the state shall not assert its 
authority, on the basis of race or color, to interfere with their 
contract. Similarly, a Negro has a state right, not a federal right, 
to be free from private interference with his access to state property 
opened to the public use. But he does have a federal right that a 
state court shall not declare it to be state policy in such a situation 
that whites have a right of access and Negroes do not. 
On the other hand, continues Abernathy, a Negro has no right, 
either federal or state, to be hired by an unwilling employer (in 
the absence of special legislation), or to be admitted to an unwilling 
householder's premises. So no constitutional question is presented 
when a state acts in furtherance of such private racial discrimina-
tion. Abernathy rounds out his analysis by allowing one type of 
privately operated activity to be classified as governmental, and 
thus subject to constitutional limitations. This category embraces 
the functions "which are indispensable to the maintenance of 
7Z Abernathy, Expansion of the State Action Concept Under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 43 CoRNELL L.Q. 375 (1958). 
78 341 U.S. 651 (1951). See also United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); 
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
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democratic government,"74 such as the electoral processes at issue 
in Terry v. Adams. 
This critique is conceptually precise. It clears away much of 
the fog generated by the Supreme Court, and in its emphasis on 
specific rights can be a most useful analytical guide. But it too 
suffers from defects. First of all, it may give a false illusion of com-
prehensiveness by failing to take account of the equivocal nature 
of the term "right." For example, a daughter would seem to have 
neither a federal nor state right to be her father's legatee, if he is 
unwilling. Yet she would seem to have a right to contract an inter-
racial marriage with a willing Negro, which the state could not 
constitutionally prohibit solely on the basis of race.75 Would the 
state be forbidden, by analogy to Barrows, to enforce her father's 
will insofar as it provided for forfeiture of her legacy if she went 
through with the prospective interracial marriage?76 Does it make 
a difference that the exercise of contractual rights on the part of 
two willing parties is being penalized on racial grounds at the 
behest of a single hostile testator, rather than at the behest of a 
united group of hostile landholders in a community? 
This leads to the deeper objection to an Abernathy-type analy-
sis. The development of constitutional theory must not be frozen 
in the established molds of property and contract law. Concepts 
must not be exalted at the expense of hard facts. It is settled that 
a willing seller and a ·willing buyer cannot be stopped from con-
cluding a realty transaction through judicial enforcement of a 
racial restrictive covenant previously entered into by the now-
willing seller and ten other residents in a community. Will the 
state be allowed to stand idly by while ten thousand residents in a 
community form a single realty corporation, sell all their land to 
it while retaining ground-rental rights, and then through resolu-
tions of the corporation's board of directors make the corporation 
a "single" unwilling seller or lessor of land to non-Caucasians? 
Perhaps the right answer, or less ambitiously the right ques-
tion, lies not in Shelley and Barrows at all, but in Terry v. Adams17 
and Marsh v. Alabama.18 In these latter cases the Supreme Court 
grappled with situations in which the state had "permitted" pri-
74 Abernathy, supra note 72, at 407. 
75 Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P .2d 17 (1948). But cf. Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 
80, 87 S.E.2d 749 (1955), judgment vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955). 
76 See note 69 supra, and related text. 
77 345 U.S. 461 (1953). 
78 326 U.S. 501 (1946). See also notes 29 through 38 supra, and related text. 
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vate organizations to act in "matters of high public interest," such 
as the electoral process, and situations in which the state had "per-
mitted" or acquiesced in their "performance of a public function," 
such as the operation of a town.79 And in these situations consti-
tutional protections applied. 
Here the real issues are framed. And the right question in the 
long search after state action becomes: "Has the state permitted, 
even by inaction, a private party to exercise such power over mat-
ters of a high public interest that to render meaningful the type 
of rights protected by the fourteenth amendment, the action of the 
private person or organization must be deemed, for constitutional 
purposes, to be the action of the state?" 
Obviously this is no open-sesame to the riddle of individual 
cases. But it directs the inquiry to the proper considerations. And 
above all it takes account of the realities of modern life. 
The notion that certain private action should be treated as state 
action is not new. English liberals such as John Stuart Mill and 
T. H. Green came to realize that restricting the state alone was 
not enough to ensure individual freedom. In some situations gov-
ernment must inhibit private action in the interest of greater free-
dom. Green in particular substantially identified state inaction 
with intervention in situations where state passivity left powerful 
private forces free to stifle individual liberties as effectively as 
could a government. 80 
In our mm day there has been similar sentiment. Professor 
Mark DeWolfe Howe suggests that when groups "exercise power 
in matters which directly concern the state they lose their privacy 
and, claiming the prerogatives of sovereignty, may not object if 
their action is treated as that of the state itself."81 Professor W. G. 
Friedmann discusses how the state "surrenders its power to the 
new massive social groups of the industrial age," and pointedly 
observes: "The corporate organizations of business and labor have 
long ceased to be private phenomena."82 And A. A. Berle states 
flatly that "a corporation, especially in some national industrial 
planning complex, is subject to the same constitutional limitations 
79Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507 
(1946); see also Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 88 (1932). 
80 GREEN, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION 206-10 (1895); see discussion in GREEN-
BERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAW 48-49 (1959). 
81 Howe, Political Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HAR.v. L. REv. 91, 95 (1953). 
82 Friedmann, Corporate Power, Government by Private Groups, and the Law, 57 
CoLUM. L. REv. 155, 165, 176 (1957). 
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as those applicable to a branch of the federal government or of the 
state government."83 
The Supreme Court itself, even in applying the traditional rule 
that state action alone can deprive a person of rights under the 
fourteenth amendment, has added a cautionary word: "We do not 
say that no conspiracy by private individuals could be of such 
magnitude and effect as to work a deprivation of equal protection 
of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under laws."84 
This is a frank though guarded recognition that there may be 
instances where the effective application of great private power 
shall have to be adjudged the equivalent of state action. Cautious 
jurisprudents will understandably still yearn for at least a formal-
istic nexus between such private action and the officially designated 
agencies of the state before calling into play constitutional protec-
tions and accompanying federal remedies. They may find some 
comfort in the respectable amount of judicial authority for the 
propositions that state inaction or official nonfeasance can be re-
garded as state action,85 that affirmative state permission for private 
action can likewise be regarded as state action, 86 and that in the 
latter instance an injured individual can obtain a remedy directly 
against the private party acting pursuant to the state's permission.87 
It would not seem a hazardous additional leap to bridge the first 
two of these propositions by equating state inaction in not stopping 
certain private action with state permission for such action.88 
Whatever the merit of all this theory, some will object, it would 
be rash in the extreme to try it out in practice. Would it not mean 
83 Berle, The Changing Role of the Corporation and Its Counsel, 10 THE REcoRD 
266, 274, 275 (1955) (arguing that a great oil company could not adopt the policy of 
refusing to sell gasoline to Negroes). See also HAu:, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW 374, 379 
(1952) (suggesting that if employen; and a union tried to keep Negroes wholly out of a 
trade, they would be unconstitutionally acting on matten; of "high public interest" with 
the aid of the state); Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HAR.v. L. REV. 201 (1937): 
Wirtz, Government by Private Groups, 13 LA. L. REV. 440 (1953). But cf. GRAY, THE 
NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 156 (2d ed. 1921) (arguing that the by-laws of a cor-
poration are not law). 
84 Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 662 (1951) (holding mob attack on a meeting 
did not deprive victims of the equal protection of the laws). 
85 Catlette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943): Picking v. Pennsylvania R. 
Co., 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945): Lynch v. United States, 189 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1951). 
86 McCabe v. Atchison, T. &: S. F. Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151 (1914): Missouri ex rel. Gaines 
v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). 
87 Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960). See also McCabe 
v. Atchison, T. &: S. F. Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151 (1914); Flemming v. South Carolina Electric 
and Gas Co., 224 F.2d 752 (4th Cir. 1955). 
88 As to the handling of elections, is this not substantially what the Supreme Court 
did in Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953)? 
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bringing under the multitude of special laws covering govern-
mental agents all the purely private persons who perform functions 
supposedly of a "high public interest" or "fundamental" to our 
society? And how are the courts going to be able to distinguish, 
anyway, between what is "fundamental" and what is not?89 To 
the first query it is enough to reply, with Mr. Justice Cardozo, that 
the "test is not whether" such private persons "are the representa-
tives of the State in the strict sense in which an agent is the repre-
sentative of his principal. The test is whether they are to be classi-
fied as representatives of the State to such an extent and in such a 
sense that the great restraints of the Constitution set limits to their 
action."00 That is the sort of problem to which judicial inventive-
ness is peculiarly adapted, and it need detain us no further. 
One cannot blink the force of the second objection. But it is 
rather a proper assessment of the scope of the challenge than a 
genuine discrediting of the worth of the undertaking. No doubt 
there would be moments of anguish when the courts tried to draw 
the line in particular cases. Yet it is axiomatic that "the great body 
of the law consists in drawing such lines."01 And the Supreme 
Court has itself noted that the grave question of the applicability 
of constitutional protections might have to turn on the drawing of 
a proper line between an unruly mob and a full-scale conspiracy,02 
or between a political club and a political party performing a state 
function.03 If, as mounting testimony indicates,04 the kind of 
rights intended to be safeguarded by the fourteenth amendment 
can be rendered truly meaningful in the modern context only by 
ascribing to certain so-called private actions the attributes of state 
action, then the courts must risk the dangers and set about the 
task.91s 
How would this approach work in various specific circum-
stances? Racial restrictive covenants would fall, not because their 
enforcement is discriminatory state action, but because in them-
89 For a voicing of these two objections, see Abernathy, Expansion of the State Action 
Concept Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 375, 404-06 (1958). 
90 Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 89 (1932). 
111 Holmes, J., dissenting in Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 241 (1926). 
92 See Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 662 (1951). 
93 See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 482 (1953). 
1H See notes 80 through 83 supra and accompanying text. 
95 See generally Pollock, Judicial Caution and Valour, in JURISPRUDENCE IN AcnoN 367 
(1953); Holmes, J., speaking for the Court in Blinn v. Nelson, 222 U.S. 1, 7 (1911) ("con-
stitutional law, like other mortal contrivances, has to take some chances"). On the specific 
issues involved here, see Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 CoLUM. L. REv. 1083, 
lll9-211 (1960). 
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selves they represent an exercise, on the prohibited basis of race, 
of the essentially public function of "zoning" real property.96 On 
the other hand, the owner of the small corner ice cream parlor 
would hardly be held to be engaged upon matters of high public 
interest when, acting wholly independently, he draws the color 
line among his employees and patrons.97 But a far more searching 
scrutiny would await any analogous policies on the part of the 
great nation-wide public utility. Discrimination here might be 
substantially like the denial of a license to practice a craft, or like 
the denial of ready access to an essential product or service. And 
hard questions indeed would have to be asked about the effect of 
racial discrimination in extensive suburban housing developments, 
regardless of how unified the developments' ownership. 
In short, the inquiry in each instance would primarily be ad-
dressed to the extent of the discriminator's power adversely to 
affect constitutional-type rights on racial grounds -and not so 
much to the relationships, in terms of traditional property or con-
tract law, among the various parties. For convenience, however, 
certain lines would likely be drawn rather mechanically. All re-
strictive covenants could be barred on the basis that any combina-
tion of persons for the purpose of zoning realty would be deemed 
state action, even though a handful of such persons might actually 
have less effective power than a relatively small, individually-o·wned 
housing development, which would not be held to governmental 
standards. 
On the authority of Terry v. Adams,98 claims of a deprivation 
of constitutional rights through the discriminatory exercise by a 
private person or group of a public function could be litigated in 
a suit brought in federal district court directly against the alleged 
96 This would call for the effective, if not technical, overruling of Corrigan v. Buckley, 
271 U.S. 323 (1926) (recognizing validity of restrictive covenants as such, in the District 
of Columbia), which would hardly be a much-lamented loss. 
97 A different case might well be presented, however, if a Negro were convicted and 
subjected to a heavy penalty under special "emergency" legislation aimed at "sit-in" 
demonstrators. See Va. Acts, chs. 96-98 (1960); N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1960, p. 38, col. 1, 
Feb. 25, 1960, p. 1, col. 3. Discriminatory application of a statute fair on its face is 
invalid. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). But cf. Randolph v. Virginia, 29 U.S. 
Law Week 2523 (Va. Sup. Ct. App., April 24, 1961). 
98345 U.S. 461 (1953). See also McCabe v. Atchison, T. &: S. F. Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151 
(1914); Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960). 
99 Abernathy, on the contrary, would first demand formal state action, through an 
adjudication by the state courts of the victim's rights, or at least through a failure by 
state authorities, upon his request, to protect his federal or state rights. Abernathy, 
Expansion of the State Action Concept Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CoRNELL 
L.Q. 375, 399, 410, 417 (1958). 
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offender.99 It would make no difference that the offender may have 
been acting in violation of state law also.100 
No intention exists that the analytical tool here fashioned 
should be used as a blunt instrument for hammering out racial 
equality under the guise of enforcing constitutional rights. Indeed, 
despite the greater protection it would afford against racial dis-
crimination on the part of massive corporate and other social struc-
tures, this whole analysis may be less helpful than a logical ex-
tension of the Shelley doctrine would be to the victims of 
discrimination resulting from contractual or testamentary arrange-
ments of a plainly private character. No matter. The purpose has 
been to develop a theory which will make meaningful in our time 
the rights sought to be protected by the fourteenth amendment 
against invasion by the action of the state. At this late date any effort 
to twist the federal system to do more might well merit something 
akin to Judge Learned Hand's poignantly skeptical remonstrance 
in a different but analogous context: " [A] society so riven that the 
spirit of moderation is gone, no court can save; ... a society where 
that spirit flourishes, no court need save; ... in a society which 
evades its responsibility by thrusting upon the courts the nurture 
of that spirit, that spirit in the end will perish."101 
CONCLUSION 
The aim has not been to supply a multitude of possible answers, 
but to frame the one right question. The proposed test accepts 
the premise, apparently now unopposed, that fourteenth amend-
ment protections operate only against state action. It rejects the 
mechanical application of any formula which would find the req-
uisite state action whenever state authorities adjudicate private dis-
putes or enforce private rights, thereby holding the action of pri-
100 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); 
see also Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913). 
101 Hand, The Contribution of an Independent Judidary to Civilization, THE SPIRIT 
OF LmERTY 164 (3d ed. 1960). (Emphasis in the original.) To say the judiciary may have 
to limit its role in furthering racial equality is but to emphasize that the legislative and 
executive branches must enlarge their own. So far, for example, Congress has done little 
to assert the power of the purse. However, one promising recent step was Executive 
Order No. 10925, March 6, 1961, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (establishing the President's Committee 
on Equal Employment Opportunity). And it may still be not too wild a dream that 
private groups and individuals will increasingly take up the task. Only the most sanguine 
could have predicted that Negro "sit-ins" in Atlanta, Georgia, would produce a peaceful 
settlement formula whereby the demonstrations were to end in return for businessmen's 
promises to desegregate lunch counters coincidently with the forthcoming integration of 
local schools. N.Y. Times, March 8, 1961, p. I, ool. 2. 
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vate persons subject in effect to constitutional limitations in these 
situations. Such a formula proves too much, leads to logical ab-
surdities, and most importantly fails to focus attention on the truly 
significant factors. 
The inquiry suggested here would concentrate on the nature 
of the privately-operated activity itself. The existence of state 
action for constitutional purposes would hinge on whether a pri-
vate activity was so invested with the public interest, and so subject 
to the control of powerful private forces, that effective impairment 
of fourteenth amendment rights could result from the action of 
these so-called private persons or groups. To the millions fighting 
the battle for racial equality in our day, this would be no ultimate 
weapon. But it should clear the way toward a realistic, meaningful 
protection of their constitutional rights against invasion by combi-
nations of private citizens or by the great social structures which, 
in our complex modern society, increasingly come to perform 
functions formerly reserved to the state. And that would be no 
small gain. 
